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Secrecy Capacity is one of the most important characteristic of a wiretap channel
in wireless communication systems. Therefore, the study of this characteristic wherein
the system has correlated channel gains and study them for different line-of-sight (LOS)
propagation scenarios is of ultimate importance.
The primary objective of this thesis from the mathematical side is to determine the
secrecy capacity for correlated channel gains for the main and eavesdropper channels for
the Gaussian Wiretap channel as a function from main parameters (µ, Σ, ρ). f (h1 , h2 ) is
the joint distribution of the two channel gains at channel use (h1 , h2 ), fi (hi ) is the main
distribution of the channel gain hi . The results are based on assumption of the Gaussian
distribution of channel gains (gM , gE ). The main task of estimating the secrecy capacity
is reduced to the problem of solving linear partial differential equations (PDE). Different
aspects of the analysis of secrecy capacity considered in this research are the estimation
of Secrecy Capacity mathematically and numerically for correlated SISO systems and a
mathematical example for MIMO systems with PDE.
The variations in Secrecy Capacity are studied for Rayleigh (N-LOS) distribution and
Rician (LOS) distribution. Suitable scenarios are identified in which secure communication
is possible with correlation of channel gains. Also, the new algorithm using PDE has a
higher speed than analog algorithms constructed on the classical statistical Monte-Carlo
methods. Taking into account the normality of the distribution of system parameters, namely
the channel gain (gM , gE ), the algorithm is constructed for systems of partial differential
equations which satisfies the secrecy criterion.

iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
First and foremost, I wish to express my sincere gratitude to my thesis advisor, Dr.
H. Andrew Harms of the Electrical & Computer Engineering Department at University of
Nebraska-Lincoln. I will always be indebted to him for his timely guidance, recommendations,
research experiences and facilities during my thesis writing and graduate school. From the
start of my graduate school, I gained the opportunity to be a Graduate Researcher for Dr.
Harms, which has molded me academically and provided a solid platform to display my
academic and research credentials.
I would like to thank and appreciate my career advisor, Dr. Hamid Sharif of the Electrical
& Computer Engineering Department at University of Nebraska-Lincoln for his guidance in
every semester of my program which helped me utilize my knowledge and skills to the best
of their potential.
I would like to thank my thesis defense committee, Prof. Won Mee Jang and Dr. Lamar
Yang of the Electrical & Computer Engineering Department at University of NebraskaLincoln, in addition with Dr. Harms, for investing their time in reviewing my thesis and
providing me positive future directions for my work.
Additionally, I wish to thank the administrative staff in UNL’s Department of Electrical
& Computer Engineering. A special acknowledgement towards the College of Engineering
and the University of Nebraska for providing me the opportunity and the facilities to fulfill
my Masters.
Finally, I am forever indebted to my parents who are my pillars of strength; a thank
you would not suffice. A big thank you to all my friends from whom I am always gaining
valuable experiences and to all the people who have contributed towards this thesis directly
and indirectly.

iv

Table of Contents

List of Figures
List of Tables

vi
viii

List of Abbreviations
List of Symbols
1 Introduction & Wireless Security Background

x
xi
1

1.1

State-of-the-art Wireless Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

1.2

Relationship between Entropy and Mutual Information . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

1.2.1

Entropy: Statistical Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

1.2.2

Mutual Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

Channel Capacity and Secrecy Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5

1.3.1

Channel Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5

1.3.2

Secrecy Criterion – Secrecy Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

1.4

Information Theoretic Secrecy: Theory & Real World Problems . . . . . . .

8

1.5

Correlation of Channel Gains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

1.6

Main Results & Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

1.7

Other Generalizations of the Main Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15

1.8

Thesis Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

1.3

2 History of Physical Layer Security & Related Works
2.1

Security at the Physical Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

20
20

v
2.2

Physical Layer Security over the Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2.1

Shannon’s Cipher System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

2.2.2

Wyner’s Wiretap Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

22

2.2.3

Gaussian Wiretap Channel & the MIMO Wiretap Channel . . . . .

24

2.3

Importance of the Available CSI at Transmitter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

26

2.4

Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

2.5

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

32

3 Fading Gaussian Wiretap Channel with Correlation of Channel Gains

34

3.1

Non-Convexity of the Secrecy Capacity Expression . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

34

3.2

Bounds on Secrecy Capacity over Correlated Fading Channels with Full CSI

35

3.3

Expected Secrecy Capacity with Correlation of Channel Gains: Using PDE . 41
3.3.1

SISO Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

3.3.2

MIMO Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4 Theoretical & Numerical Results
4.1

47
51

Expected Secrecy Capacity with Correlation of Channel Gains using MonteCarlo Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

4.2

Comparison of Expected Secrecy Capacity using Monte-Carlo method & PDE
for Correlated Channel Gains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5 Conclusions
5.1

Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Bibliography

53
61
62
63

vi

List of Figures

1.1

Gaussian Wiretap Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.2

The joint density f (h1 , h2 ) plot for different values of correlation coefficient

2

ρ = −0.9, −0.5, 0, 0.99. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3

Grid of the points in the (µ1 , µ2 ) plane for estimation of the secrecy capacity CS

14

2.1

Shannon’s model of a secrecy system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

22

2.2

Wyner’s wiretap channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23

4.1

Contour plot of Secrecy Capacity as function of correlation ρ and SN R . . . .

52

4.2

Contour plot of the secrecy capacity CS as function of the parameters (µ1 , µ2 )
calculated by MC method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4.3

Contour plot of the secrecy capacity CS as function of the parameters (µ1 , µ2 )
calculated by PDE from Eqn. (3.12) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4.4

55

Contour plot of the secrecy capacity CS as function of the parameters (σ1 , σ2 ) ∈
[0, 10]2 calculated by PDE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4.5

54

57

Contour plot of the secrecy capacity CS as function of the parameters (ρ, SN R) ∈
[−1, 1] × [0, 5] for different values of (µ1 , µ2 ) and for constant SNR at the Eavesdropper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4.6

58

Contour plot of the secrecy capacity CS as function of the parameters (ρ, SN R) ∈
[−1, 1] × [0, 5] for the values (µ1 = 0, µ2 = 1) and for constant SNR at the
Eavesdropper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

59

vii
4.7

Contour plot of Secrecy Capacity as function of correlation ρ and signal-to-noise
ratio SN R for N-LOS propagation with varying SNR at the receiver and constant
SNR at the eavesdropper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

60

viii

List of Tables

1.1

Existing ways of estimation of CS for different systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

2.1

Main results of estimation of CS for different system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

33

4.1

Execution time for MC and PDE algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

53

ix

x

List of Abbreviations

Abbreviations

Explanation

AWGN

Additive White Gaussian Noise

BC

Broadcast Channel

BC-CM

BC with Confidential Messages

CDF

Cumulative Distribution Function

CSI

Channel State Information

CS , SC

Secrecy Capacity

DE

Differential Equation

MC

Monte Carlo method

MIMO

Multiple Input Multiple Output

MaMIMO

Massive MIMO

MISO

Multiple Input Single Output

MGBC-CM

Multi-Antenna Gaussian BC with Confidential Messages

MMSE

Minimum Mean Square Error

OSI

Open Systems Interconnection

PDE

Partial Differential Equation

PDF

Probability Density Function

RCI

Regularized Channel Inversion

SDPC

Secret Dirty Paper Coding

SIMO

Single Input Multiple Output

SINR

Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise-Ratio

SISO

Single Input Single Output system

SNR

Signal-to-Noise Ratio

xi

List of Symbols

• X or X n – Input signal (Alice signal);
• Y or Y n – Legitimate output signal (Bob signal);
• Z or Z n – Eavesdropper output signal (Eve signal);
• n – Length of signal X;
• m – Length of signal Y ;
• k – Length of signal Z;
• N = n(m + k) – Number of parameters in the system;
• gM – Channel gain between X and Y , m × n matrix;
• gE – Channel gain between X and Z, k × n matrix;
• µ – Average values of (gM , gE ), N × 1 vector;
• Σ – Covariance matrix for (gM , gE ), N × N matrix;
• ρ – Correlation vector of the parameters of system (gM , gE ), N × N matrix
• h = (h1 , h2 ) – Realization of the channel gains (gM , gE );
• ∼ – Distributed by (density, mass function/ probability law);
• nM – Additive Gaussian noise in legitimate channel, m × 1 random process;
• nE – Additive Gaussian noise in eavesdropper channel, m × 1 random process;

xii
• f , pX – density of the random variable;
• fµ,Σ – density of the Gaussian random variable with average values µ and covariance
matrix Σ;
• H(X) – entropy of the random variable X;
• H(X|Y ) – conditional entropy of the random variable X by random variable Y ;
• P (x, y) – probability P (X = x and Y = y);
• Perror – probability of the error in the channel;
• T r(A) – trace of the matrix A;
• diag(a1 , ..., an ) – n × n matrix with diagonal elements a1 , ..., an , where all other nondiagonal elements are 0;
• ∆f (x) – increment of the function f in point x;
• kx − yk – Euclidean distance between x and y;
• det(A) – determinant of the matrix A;
• O(f ) – asymptotic notation regard function f ;
• CSlim (dist) – asymptotic value of the secrecy capacity for SN R → ∞ for distribution
dist;
• A → B, A ⇒ B – channel between A and B.

1

Chapter 1

Introduction & Wireless Security Background

1.1

State-of-the-art Wireless Security

The widely used mathematical solutions for analyzing the operation of transmission channels,
taking into account the presence of an eavesdropper, are random processes and random
variables that allow accurate determination of the basic characteristics of communication
channels. In this research, the same approach will be used – the simulation of transmission
systems in the capacity of random processes.
Another important factor to be considered is the presence of uncertainty, which describes
the ”undeterministic” components of any model. This model considered contains two sources
of uncertainty:
1. The uncertainty of the model itself.
2. Existence of the random noises in the wireless physical layer.
These will be described using random variables and random processes, namely:
1. Uncertainty of the model by assumption, that coefficients of the model are random
variables;
2. Random noises in the wireless physical layer by Additive White Gaussian Noise
(AWGN) in the channel.

2
For defining nature of the randomness, the standard notation RV ∼ f (F ) will be used, where
this notation means that the random variable RV has density f (distributed by probability
law F 1 ).
It can be argued that the protection of information (or minimization of the possibility of
loss of information) is one of the most important tasks in any organization or company. In
this study, the AWGN Wiretap channel which is described below in Fig. 1.1 is considered:

Figure 1.1: Gaussian Wiretap Channel

where parameters of the system are:
• X n , the input parameter (signal) of the system – vector of the order n × 1;
• gM , gE , the channel gains of the main and eavesdropper channels respectively – matrices
of the size m × n and k × n respectively;
• nM , nE are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian noises with zero
mean and unit variance – m and k dimensional Gaussian processes.
The mathematical model of the channel in Fig. 1.1 is given by
1

For example, F in normal distribution N (0, 1).

3



 Y n = gM X n + nM ,

(1.1)


 Z = g Xn + n .
n
E
E

Many authors in their works [8, 9, 35, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42] use separation of the model by
SISO, SIMO, MISO and MIMO by the following notations of the coefficients:
• gM , gE , nM , nE for SISO systems;
• gM , gE , nM , nE for MISO and SIMO systems;
• GM , GE , NM , NE for MIMO and MaMIMO systems.
These designations will not be used, but instead the dimensions of the matrices gM , gE and
vectors nM , nE will be determined. Note that finding a closed form for CS is a difficult task,
and this form is not found for all cases. The main methods for finding this indicator are
described in the table below:
System
SISO
MISO
SIMO
MIMO
Correlated systems

Existing of closed form
Yes
Particularly
No
No
No

Method of estimation CS
Monte Carlo methods; DE
Monte Carlo methods
Monte Carlo methods
Monte Carlo methods
Monte Carlo methods

Table 1.1: Existing ways of estimation of CS for different systems
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1.2

Relationship between Entropy and Mutual Information

1.2.1

Entropy: Statistical Approach

As described in the previous section, the main sources of uncertainty in the mathematical
model are random variables (gM , gE , nM , nE ). Therefore, in this thesis, the definition of
uncertainty constructed for random variables will be used. This definition of uncertainty is
used in communication difficulties, and other applied mathematical problems [21].
The entropy of a random variable X with density pX (x) is a function which attempts
to characterize the unpredictability of this random variable [5]. There exist many ways to
define this unpredictability. The definition for entropy as given by Shannon [5, 20] is:

H(X) = −

Z

log(pX (x))pX (x)dx.

(1.2)

R

For discrete random variables, entropy is defined as

H(X) = −

X

log(pi )pi ,

(1.3)

i

where pi > 0 are all positive probabilities for the values of X.
1.2.2

Mutual Information

Mutual information is a quantity that measures the relationship between two random
variables that are sampled simultaneously. This measure provides how much information is
communicated in one random variable about another and for this work it is very important
to know how much does one random variable tells about another2 . The definition of mutual
information is given by conditional entropy between two random variables X and Y :

I(X; Y ) =

X

X

x∈RX y∈RY
2

P (x, y)
P (x, y)log
P (x)P (y)




= H(X) − H(X|Y ).

(1.4)

How accurate the distribution of the one variable by some information about the other variable could be
predicted
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In machine learning and deep learning for classification problems, the above definition is
said to be the information gain. The relation described by Eqn.(1.4) is the main relation
between entropy H(X), conditional entropy H(X|Y ) and mutual information I(X; Y ). The
entropy H(X), conditional entropy H(X|Y ) and mutual information I(X; Y ) should satisfy
the relation:
0 ≤ I(X; Y ) ≤ H(X) ≤ 1.
Eqn. (1.4) gives a good understanding of the nature of mutual information in two limit
cases: Y = X and independent X and Y . In the first case

H(X|Y ) = H(X|X) = 0 =⇒ I(X; Y ) = H(X).

In the second case

P (x, y) = P (x)P (y) =⇒ H(X|Y ) = H(X) =⇒ I(X; Y ) = 0.

These two cases correspond to the conditions of total dependence and complete independence of random variables or in terms of the correlation between variables Y and Z: ρ = ±1
or ρ = 0. In classification problems, mutual information is called information gain [27] and
characterizes the level of influence of the attributes by response variable, which describe
class of the object.

1.3
1.3.1

Channel Capacity and Secrecy Capacity
Channel Capacity

To consider an arbitrary optimization problem, the target function (index), which depends
on the parameters of the model needs to be determined. This indicator will be the difference
between channel capacities for main channel and eavesdropper. So, one of core terms of this
study is channel capacities, defined by the highest information rate (in units of information
per unit time) that can be achieved with arbitrarily small error probability [5]. According
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to Shannon - Hartley theorem [14] for channels with noise, throughput of this channel is the
limiting transmission rate, which can be achieved with arbitrarily small probability of error.
Some authors consider error probability as the main characteristic of the system. For
example, authors in [36] focus on a different index for secrecy of the channels, namely the
probability of errors. In my research, this characteristic is closely related to the correlation
for channels. This feature is more understandable as it shows the probability that the
eavesdropper will not be able to decode the received message.
Main task in [25] is finding the upper bound of the decoding error for MIMO systems in
Wyners wire-tap channel setting. Authors in [25] show that decoding error in the system
satisfies the relation:
Perror ≤ exp (−nEr ) ,
where Perror is the probability of error, n is length of the message, Er is Gallagers random
coding exponent.
One of the main tasks of my thesis is maximizing the main channel reliability by choosing
”optimal parameters” of the system. Using Eqn(1.4), only one parameter of X – which is
density (or mass function) P (x) of the random variable X can be defined. It is intuitively
clear that the reliability of the channel increases only by changing the properties (distribution)
of X, that is
CS (X) = sup I(X; Y ),

(1.5)

P (x)∈P

where P is the class of the densities (mass functions) of the random variable X. In terms of
the SNR P , let us define class P of the possible distributions in terms of covariance matrix
of the input signal X:
P = {P (x) : T r(cov(X)) ≤ P } ,
where P (x) is the distribution of the random variable X, cov(X) is the covariance of the
random variable X, T r(A) is the trace of the matrix A.
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1.3.2

Secrecy Criterion – Secrecy Capacity

Using the definition from Eqn(1.5), one can interpret the reliability of the system (or secrecy
criterion) depicted in Fig.1.1 as a maximization of the capacity of the main channel (X → Y ),
taking into account the minimization of the channel capacity of the second channel (X → Z),
which is the same as maximizing the difference between the channel capacities for the
legitimate and eavesdropper channels.
Hence, the main task is maximizing information rate in Legitimate channel (X → Y )
with minimizing information rate in Eavesdropper channel channel (X → Z).
Using the definition given from Eqn.(1.5), the secrecy capacity can be defined as

CS = sup (I(X; Y ) − I(X; Z))

(1.6)

P (x)∈P

where P is the class of the densities (mass functions) of the random variable X. In fact,
this formula defines maximization of the difference between the channel capacities of two
channels (main and eavesdropper). Channel capacity is given by the following:
1
I(X; Y ) = log(det(I + H 0 ΣH))
2
where H is the channel gain, Σ is the covariance matrix of input signal X:
cov(X) = E((X − EX)0 (X − EX))

Note that these equations of the channel capacity define the same result for SI* system,
but different result for MI* systems 3 .
Now to explain this concept on a concrete example, which is based on Fig. 1.1. Assume
that the legitimate channel (X → Y ) is the channel between Alice and Bob and eavesdropper
channel (X → Z) is channel between Alice and Eve. Suppose, Alice wants to send message
3
SI* systems means SISO and SIMO systems;
MI* systems means MISO, MIMO, MaMIMO systems.
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to Bob maintaining confidentiality of message from Eve. By this description, Bob is the
legitimate receiver and Eve is the eavesdropper.
The idea of Alice is to move information at the highest possible rate with high secrecy.
Perfect secrecy is obtained when Eve fails to decode any confidential information without
taking into account the computing power available. The concept of perfect secrecy precludes
use of any cryptographic technique, because such techniques fail when the eavesdropper has
infinite computing power. Is there any way to obtain perfectly secret communication in
existence of an eavesdropper with infinite computing power? The answer is ”yes” and it
follows from the information-theoretic approach of achieving secret communication. The
’catch’ is that Alice has to send information at a lower rate satisfying the secrecy constraint.
For example, consider a very basic wire-tap channel. Assume that both channels are fixed; the
point to point capacity of the legitimate channel is 5 bits per channel use and eavesdropper
channel is 2 bits per channel use. The fundamental information of the theoretic results state,
that a coding scheme can be constructed for perfectly secret communication if rate of the
code, i.e., the rate of communication, occurs less than the difference of the capacities of the
channels, which is 3 bits per channel use for previous case. The plan of constructing such
coding scheme is to include noise in the encoding process to confuse the eavesdropper.

1.4

Information Theoretic Secrecy: Theory & Real World Problems

The main consideration with each theory is the assumptions on which the theory is based. In
this case, all the main assumptions are based on the mathematical model given by Eqn.(1.1).
By assumption, the model is linear and the noise in two channels have normal (Gaussian)
distribution. One important simplification of the mathematical model in Eqn.(1.1) is that
the channel gains are constants, and therefore do not depend on each other. As described
above, channel capacities of legitimate and eavesdropper channels do not depend on the
other channel. Its model corresponds to the case ρ = 0 in terms of correlation.
To solve another problem, the assumption about fixture of the channel gains should be
changed. Assume that channel gains are correlated random variables with joint distribution
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f (h1 , h2 ), where dimension of the vector h1 corresponds to the dimension of the matrix gM ,
dimension of the vector h2 is the dimension of the matrix gE , respectively.
The main tool for better understanding of the problem is modification of the mathematical
model of the system. It can be done as follows:
• By generalization of the properties of random additive noises nM and nE .
• By generalization of the properties of channel gains gM and gE .
For this study, using the second option with generalization of the properties of channel gains
gM and gE . There exist many works [8, 9, 35, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42] which use generalization
by second option. Using the same generalization of the model in Eqn. (1.1), assuming that
channel gains possess the following property:

(gM , gE ) ∼ f (h1 , h2 ),

(1.7)

where f (h1 , h2 ) is the density over Euclidean space Rn(m+k) . Note that this description of
the problem is more realistic than the constant case of gM and gE . All advantages of this
approach will be discussed in the next section.

1.5

Correlation of Channel Gains

The main assumption about density f (h1 , h2 ) for calculation is given by:
1

1

0

−1 (h−µ)

f (h1 , h2 ) = (2π)−N det(Σ)− 2 e− 2 (h−µ) Σ

,

(1.8)

where Σ is a covariance n(m + k) × n(m + k) matrix for µ – n(m + k) vector, which defines
average values of each parameter,

N=

n(m + k)
.
2
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In particular for n = m = k = 1, matrix Σ and vector µ is given by:










σ12


 µ1 
 h1 
,Σ = 
,µ = 

h=

h2



ρσ1 σ2 

ρσ1 σ2

µ2

σ22

,

where ρ is the correlation between channel gains gM and gE .
Consider density f (h1 , h2 ) for n = m = k = 1 with covariance matrix




 1 ρ 

Σ=

ρ 1

.

The density f (h1 , h2 ) changes for different values of correlation coefficient shown in the
Fig.1.2 below. For better understanding of the changes of secrecy capacity as function of ρ,
consider the next representation of the channel gain gE :

gE = µ2 + ρ(gM − µ1 ) +

q

1 − ρ2 gA ,

where gA ∼ N (0, 1) is one dimensional normal distributed random variable with zero mean
and variance σ 2 = 1. Now, assume that ρ → 1. In this case

gE ≈ µ2 − µ1 + gM .

Here we use next fact about distribution of gE by known value of gM :
gE |gM ∼ N (µ2 − ρ(µ1 − gE ), (1 − ρ2 )σ 2 ).

Therefore µ2 − µ1 > 0 and it implies that

gE − gM ≈ µ2 − µ1 > 0

Now assume that probability that µ1 < 0 and µ2 < 0 is about 0. Using these facts, we
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Figure 1.2: The joint density f (h1 , h2 ) plot for different values of correlation coefficient
ρ = −0.9, −0.5, 0, 0.99.

get
1
2
2
(I(X; Y ) − I(X; Y ))+ = (log(1 + gM
R) − log(1 + gE
R)) = 0
2
Using this fact, simple conclusion in the case µ2 − µ1 > 0 is obtained

CS = 0.

For a general case, the number of correlation parameters is M =

ρ = (ρ1 , ..., ρM ).

n(m+k)(n(m+k)−1)
:
2
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The number of correlations between elements of the channel gains gM and gE are
Mb = n2 mk.

For simplification of the mathematical part, it can be assumed that elements in the two
channels are independent meaning that the matrix Σ can be represented in the next form


Σ=




2 (M ))
diag(σ12 (M ), ..., σnm

Corr

Corr0

2 (E))
diag(σ12 (E), ..., σnk


,

(1.9)

where diag(σ12 , ..., σl2 ) is l × l diagonal matrix with diagonal elements σ12 , ..., σl2 , Corr is
covariance matrix between elements of the channel gains gM and gE .

1.6

Main Results & Contributions

Main results of this thesis is reducing the task of finding the secrecy capacity with correlated
channel gains using Eqn. (1.8) to the task of solving of the partial differential equations.
Different LOS scenarios are simulated for identifying the scenarios where good secrecy is
possible. The basic methods for finding secrecy capacity at present are statistical methods
(Monte Carlo methods) [41, 45] that require the execution of a large number of operations
(iterations). In this way, the speed of the algorithm is significantly reduced.
In this research, the use of differential equations in partial derivatives to find the secrecy
capacity for SISO & MIMO systems is proposed. This approach greatly reduces the number
of operations for calculations of secrecy capacity. This approach has some common ideas
with work [32], but the authors of this work consider the deterministic case (gM and gE ).
The novelty of work [32] considers the impact of small variations in channel gains on the
secrecy rate of a wiretap channel, in which it is assumed that imperfect channel knowledge is
available at the transmitter. Hence, the main result of is focused in considering the secrecy
capacity with varying channel gains. The main results are formulated in Theorem 1, in
which the increment of secrecy capacity is defined as a function of the increments of gM and
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gE :
∆CS =

gM P
2
2
gM P + σM

∆gM −

gE P
2
2 ∆gE
gE P + σE

+ o(max(∆gM , ∆gE )),

(1.10)

where ∆CS = CS (gM + ∆gM , gE + ∆gE ) − CS (gM , gE ). Using this approach, the authors
construct an algorithm for calculating secrecy capacity, which is based on the following
formula:

CS (gM + ∆gM , gE + ∆gE ) ≈ CS (gM , gE ) +

gM P
2
2
gM P + σM

∆gM −

gE P
2 ∆gE .
2
gE P + σE

A more statistical model, which is considered in this study, secrecy capacity is the
function from 3 main parameters:

CS = CS (ρ, µ, Σ).

Using properties of the expectation and properties of density of the multivariate normal
distribution, it is proved that secrecy capacity CS satisfies the next first order partial
differential equation (PDE):
n(m+k)
X
∂CS
∂CS
ui (ρ, µ, Σ)
+
= u0 (ρ, µ, Σ)CS ,
∂ρ
∂µi
i=1

where

∂y
∂x

(1.11)

is partial derivative of the function y by variable x. Using this equation, it is

easy to estimate the values of SC in every finite region of the set parameters (ρ, µ, Σ). For
uniqueness of the solution, it is necessary to determine the boundary conditions. In this
case, these conditions are most easily determined for the following parameter values:

µi = 0; ρ = 0.

For defining the boundary conditions, results of the work [32] can be used. Also, boundary
values for CS can by used by Monte Carlo method or some other estimations.
Consider estimation of the secrecy capacity, based on Eqn.(1.11). Assume that µ ∈ R2 ,
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and the correlation parameter ρ is fixed. In this case, the last equation can be rewritten as
∂CS
∂CS
+ u2 (ρ, µ, Σ)
= u0 (ρ, µ, Σ)CS .
∂µ1
∂µ2

Figure 1.3: Grid of the points in the (µ1 , µ2 ) plane for estimation of the secrecy capacity CS
Fig.1.3 represents grid of the points on (µ1 , µ2 ) plane for estimation of secrecy capacity
CS , where red dots indicate boundary condition points, blue dots indicate interior points.
Values for secrecy capacity in the interior points can be calculated, using the estimation:
CS (ρ, µ) − CS (ρ, µ − ∆1 µ)
CS (ρ, µ) − CS (ρ, µ − ∆2 µ)
+ u2 (ρ, µ, Σ)
≈
∆µ1
∆µ2
u0 (ρ, µ, Σ)CS (ρ, µ),
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where






 ∆µ1 
 , ∆2 µ = 

∆1 µ = 





0

0
∆µ2


.

Using this approximation, estimation of secrecy capacity CS in points (µ1,i , µ2,j ) is obtained
by the next recurrent formula:

CS,i,j =

−1
∆µ−1
1 CS,(i−1),j + ∆µ2 u2,i,j CS,i,j−1
−1
∆µ−1
1 + u2,i,j ∆µ2 − u0,i,j

=

∆µ2 CS,(i−1),j + ∆µ1 u2,i,j CS,i,j−1
≈
∆µ2 + u2,i,j ∆µ1 − µ2 µ1 u0,i,j
∆µ2 CS,(i−1),j + ∆µ1 u2,i,j CS,i,j−1
.
∆µ2 + u2,i,j ∆µ1
For complexity of the classical algorithm calculated by Monte Carlo method and the
algorithm comparison, consider the parameters of the system: N – number of iterations in
the Monte Carlo method, M1 – number of points in µ1 axis, M2 – number of points in µ2
axis. Using these parameters, the number of flops in the tow algorithm is received:

NClassical = M1 ∗ M2 ∗ N,

NN ewAlgo. = (M1 + M2 − 1) ∗ N + 3 ∗ M1 ∗ M2 .
Thus, the developed algorithm has much faster performance under the condition

N  max(M1 , M2 ).

1.7

Other Generalizations of the Main Model

H. Mahdavifar and A. Vardy [19], instead of constructing the vector v ∈ (0, 1)n by setting
vR = e, vA = u, and vB = 0; set vR = e, vA = u, and vB = s, where s is a fixed binary
vector known a priori to all the parties. The authors then showed that there exists a choice
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such that following qualities hold

lim

k→∞

I(U ; Z)
= 0, lim Rn = C(W ∗ ) − C(W ).
n→∞
k

Mahdavifar’s and A. Vardy’s results also extend to discrete memory-less channels with
non-binary input.
O.O. Koyluoglu, C.E. Koksal and H.E. Gamal [13] studied scaling behavior of the
capacity of wireless networks under secrecy constraints. For extended networks with the
path loss model, legitimate nodes and the eavesdropper were randomly placed in the network
according to Poisson point processes. It is shown that when λe = o (log n)−2 , almost all


nodes achieve a secure rate of Ω



√1
n



, showing that securing the transmissions does not

entail a loss in the per-node throughput for the model, where transmissions from other
users are considered as noise at receivers. Their achievability argument is based on the
novel secure multi-hop forwarding strategy where forwarding nodes are chosen such that no
eavesdroppers exist in appropriately constructed secrecy zones around them and independent
randomization is employed in each hop. Tools from percolation theory were used to establish
the existence of a sufficient number of secure highways allowing for network connectivity.
Finally, a time division approach was used to accomplish an end-to-end secure connection
between almost all source-destination pairs.
With regards to digital communication, ref.[2] describes the transfer of bit-streams from
one geographical location to another in different physical environments, such as wired pairs,
coaxial cable, optical fiber and radio. The approach of this book is to extract the general
principles underlying a range of media and applications and present them in a single structure.
This has to do with the design of a variety of systems, including voice and video digital
cellular phones, digital cable television, wireless local area networks, digital subscriber loop,
metallic Ethernet, modems for voice-band data and satellite communications system.
As a continuation, it is interesting to get acquainted with work [22], which considers the
use of artificial interference to reduce the likelihood that a confidential message transmitted
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between two multi-antenna nodes will be intercepted by a passive interceptor. In this article,
part of the transmit power is used to broadcast an information signal, which should be
enough to guarantee a certain data rate for the intended receiver, and the remaining power is
used to broadcast the artificial noise to mask the desired signal from a potential interceptor.
A modified water filling algorithm has been proposed that balances the required transmit
power with the number of spatial measurements sufficient to prevent the eavesdropping
device from recognizing the transmitted information. There is also an increase in secrecy in
modeling the proposed transmission scheme.
[30] discusses the use of artificial noise to reduce the likelihood that a message transmitted
between two multi-antenna nodes will be intercepted by an undetected interceptor. The
effectiveness of the relative signal-to-interference-plus-noise- ratio (SINR) of one transmitted
data stream as a performance metric is shown.
In [31], the potential secrecy of composite listening channels was studied in the case
of arbitrary sets of uncertainties (not necessarily countable or final states) and continuous
input / output alphabets. The secrecy of a composite Gaussian MIMO listening channel
was established while limiting the spectral norm on the interception channel. In this case,
the channel does not have to be degraded.
The secrecy capacity is given in closed form:

X

CS =

i:gi >λ+

ln

X
2 + ( + gi )zi
gi
+
ln
,

2gi + ( + gi )zi
i:g >λ+
i

where gi are eigenvalues of the matrix of the channel to the legitimate receiver, fixed and
known to the transmitter;  > 0;
s

zi = max

4gi
1+
( + gi )2



!

gi − 
−1
λ

− 1, λ > 0.

It was shown that the property of saddle point is preserved, so that the composite
bandwidth is equal to the worst-case value, and the transmission of signals over the worst
channel reaches the composite bandwidth. Also, the isotropic interceptor shown is the worst
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case, and the transmission of signals on the eigenmodes of the legitimate channel is optimal.
The results apply to non-isotropic sets of uncertainties. It is shown that the presence of a
maximum element in a set of uncertainties is sufficient for a saddle point to exist, so that
the composite bandwidth is equal to the worst, and signaling on the worst channel reaches
the bandwidth of the entire class of channels. In addition, these results are summarized to
include legitimate channel uncertainty.
In [15], a method for ensuring secure communication by sending artificial noise by a
transmitting antenna of a legitimate receiver is proposed. The path loss component in the
far-field zone is considered and one concept of the field of wiretap channel secrecy is presented,
that can be useful in developing security solutions at the physical level. Experimentally, by
constructing a mathematical model, it was shown that the proposed method can provide
high security in practical conditions, especially when the attacker’s location is near the
intended receiver. According to the authors, the proposed method can be combined with
the existing method of forming a beam mask to further improve secrecy.
The Poisson process is an integral part in describing the functioning of communication
networks. In article [34], the Poisson process of both secondary users and eavesdroppers
is considered, and the effect of stochastic interference on fundamental limits of secure
communication in a cognitive radio network is analyzed. A closed form for the secret
capacitance between the main transmitter and receivers is obtained:
(

Cs = max log2

P
1+
||xi − xj ||α (W + IP )

!



− log2

)

P
1+
,0 ,
∗
||xi − e ||α (W + IE )


where ||xi − xj || is the distance between node xi and node xj , and α is the loss exponent of
medium, P is the transmit power of primary nodes, IP is the interference powers of P , IE is
the interference power of eavesdroppers from the cognitive users. Based on the theory of
stochastic geometry, the influence of spatial Poisson process of primary and intercepting
nodes on the secrecy capacity CS and the probability of failure between a node and its
neighbors are shown.
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1.8

Thesis Outline

The thesis is devoted to the case when the channel gains are multi-normally distributed:

(gM , gE ) ∼ N (µ, Σ).

The outline of the thesis is described as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the main systems
related to the wireless transfer of information. We will consider two main wiretap transmission
systems – Shannon’s Cipher System and Wyner’s Wiretap Channel. This chapter describes
the difference between these systems and their mathematical models. Also the MIMO
channel is introduced and methods are described for finding the main characteristics of
MIMO systems. Another part of this section is the description of the influence of random
perturbations in the MIMO system – nM and nE .
Chapter 3, partly, is an overview of methods of finding the secrecy capacity for SISO
and MIMO systems with correlated channel gains gM and gE . Also, this chapter describes
the main work devoted to these systems, where the channels have different distributions –
exponential distribution, Rayleigh and Rician distributions, Gaussian and normal distributions. In this chapter a new method for finding the secrecy capacity with the use of Partial
Differential Equations is considered. We find systems of partial differential equations for the
secrecy capacity in the parameter areas µi , σj , ρk . Two algorithms for constructing systems
of partial differential equations for SISO and MIMO systems in the areas of average values
of channels gains (µ1 , ..., µn(k+m) ) are considered.
Chapter 4 of the thesis is devoted to numerical examples, in which the interrelation
between the secrecy capacity and the main parameters of the system (µi , σj , ρk ) is analyzed
in detail. A comparison of the Monte Carlo method and the method based on PDE, is
carried out. Line of Sight (LOS) and Non-Line of Sight (N-LOS) scenarios are considered
and graphs plotted similarly for Rayleigh and Rician distributions are evaluated. Chapter 4
is followed by the Conclusion and Future Research.
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Chapter 2

History of Physical Layer Security & Related Works

2.1

Security at the Physical Layer

Wireless networks have become an indispensable part of our daily life, widely used in civilian
and military applications. Security is a critical issue in wireless applications where people
rely heavily on wireless networks for transmission of important/private information, such as
credit card transactions or banking related data communications.
Most commonly used security methods rely on cryptographic techniques employed at
the upper layers in the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model of a wireless network. If
two users do not have their private key in the symmetric cryptosystem, a secure channel is
required for the key exchange. Instead of using an additional channel, the physical layer
methods can be employed here to distribute secret keys, to supply location privacy and
to supplement upper-layer security algorithms. The application of physical layer security
schemes makes it more difficult for attackers to decipher transmitted information.
The model described in Eqn.(1.1) consists of two main operations – ⊕ and ⊗. The first
operation means the matrix multiplication by vector. Consider the operation ⊕ in sense
of binary signals, where each single-input channel Xi ∈ {0, 1}. This assumption becomes a
number of different input signals if equal,
NX = 2|X| = 2n .
Also, the number of changed bytes after operation ⊕ is equal NX = 2|X| = 2n bytes by
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assumption Yi , Zi ∈ {0, 1}. Using this assumption, one can conclude, that number of different
matrices, which cover all possible cases, are
n

NX⇒Y = 2m∗2 .

In all calculations below, let’s now use constraints about channel gains gM and gE , which are
displayed in the form of a joint distribution of (gM , gE ). This assumption greatly simplifies
all mathematical calculations.

2.2

Physical Layer Security over the Years

The problem considered in this research was also considered in some other works [10, 35],
which will be mentioned below in the literature review. The novelty of this work is the
generalization of the model Eqn. (1.1) according to the assumption of the correlation
between the channel gains gM and gE . As will be shown below, the presence of correlation
for channels can lead to both increase and decrease of the secrecy capacity CS . Therefore,
it is not surprising that many works [40, 43] are devoted to the these systems – Shannons
Cipher System, Wyner’s Wiretap Channels, Gaussian Wiretap Channels, MIMO Wiretap
Channels and Ma-MIMO Wiretap Channels.

2.2.1

Shannon’s Cipher System

Consider the classical Shannons Cipher System, which is described as follows: let X n =
(X1 , ..., Xn ) be a message where each letter takes values on a finite set X . This message
is securely communicated from a transmitter to a receiver, both of which have access to a
common secure key K = U k of purely k random bits independent of X n . The transmitter
computes the cryptogram
Y = F un(X n , U k )
and sends it to the receiver over a public channel. The cryptogram may have variable
length. The encryption function F un is invertible for any fixed length of the message n. The
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receiver, knowing Y and U k , computes X n . The functions F un and F un−1 are published.

Figure 2.1: Shannon’s model of a secrecy system.

This is an apt description of the Shannons Cipher System. Now, if a wiretapping attacker
has access to the cryptogram, can attempt to identify the secure key without knowledge of
the transmitter or the receiver. The attacker can use knowledge of the statistics of X n .
Pioneer work in Shannon cipher system considered Ciphertext-only attack, where Eve
(the eavesdropper) is assumed to have access to the ciphertext c. The target for Eve would be
to try to recover the secret key k, the plaintext (original signal) X n , or possibly some partial
information about the plaintext. This is the weakest form of an attack that is considered in
work [40].

2.2.2

Wyner’s Wiretap Channel

Wyner introduced the notion of the wire-tap channel (Fig. 2.2) in study [43]. Alice wants
to communicate a message X to Bob through a communication channel V : X → Y . Eve
also has access to what Alice transmits via a wire-tappers channel W : X → Z and the aim
of Alice is to keep the message hidden from Eve while maximizing the rate of information
transmitted to Bob.

Rate =

1
log(|M |)
n
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Figure 2.2: Wyner’s wiretap channel

Wyner [43] showed that, given any input distribution PX , Alice can communicate reliably
to Bob at any rate up to
I(X; Y ) − I(X; Z)
What is the difference between Shannon and Wyner models? The Shannon model sends an
encrypted message X n by some transformation1 , and the eavesdropper (Eve) tries to decrypt
it, or decrypt only part of this message. In Wyner’s model, the message is sent without
encryption, but the eavesdropper channel is statistically worse than legitimate channel (Bob
channel). Wyner proves that secure communication is possible in this case. Therefore, two
main differences between Shannon and Wyner models can be specified:
• In Shannon cipher model, plain-text X n is encrypted, the characteristics of the
legitimate channel (Bob) and eavesdropper channel (Eve) are the same. Hence,
statistical (probabilistic) characteristics of the signals Y and Z are the same, because
Y = Z.
• Wyner’s model assumes that the channels for Bob and Eve have different properties
(statistical properties). This means that statistical (probabilistic) characteristics of
the signals Y and Z are different.
1

Defined by operations ⊕ and ⊗
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2.2.3

Gaussian Wiretap Channel & the MIMO Wiretap Channel

In the previous two subsections, the systems without noise (without external influences)
were considered. The main mathematical model of this work includes random additional
noises nM and nE . These two additional terms change properties of the system and also as
showed in other studies, difference in distribution of the terms nM and nE generate varying
values for the secrecy capacity.
Main pioneer work related to wiretap channels describe single input single output (SISO)
systems. But with the development of real systems, it became clear that considering these
systems is not enough for real-life problems. Therefore, the main work from the last two
decades is devoted to more complex systems, namely multi-input multi-output (MIMO)
systems.
The account of noise in the system for the time being is an integral part of any model,
since none of the created systems are perfect. Initial work related to the transmission of
information [40, 43] did not take into account the presence of noise for two reasons:
1. At the time of the release of these two papers, the probability theory and random
processes theory was not widely used in applied problems.
2. The authors of these works have considered idealized systems, which excluded the
presence of other objects except Alice, Bob and Eve.
Ruoheng Liu and H. V. Poor [28] in paper ”Multi-antenna Gaussian broadcast channels
with confidential messages” investigated the secrecy capacity region of a generally nondegraded Gaussian BC with confidential messages for two users, where the transmitter
has t antennas and each user has a single antenna. For this model, they have proposed
a secret dirty-paper coding scheme and introduced a computable Sato-type outer bound.
Furthermore, authors have proved that boundary of the secret dirty paper coding rate region
is consistent with the Sato-type outer bound for multiple-antenna Gaussian BC, and hence,
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have obtained the secrecy capacity region for the MGBC-CM.

CSM G = co


 [





ΣM G−2 (β) .

0≤β≤1



Unlike the single-antenna Gaussian BC-CM case, in which only the superior user can
obtain confidential information at a positive secrecy rate, the result has illustrated that
both users can achieve strictly positive rates with information-theoretic secrecy through
a multiple-antenna Gaussian BC if attenuation vectors imposed on user 1 and user 2 are
linear independent. Therefore, it becomes more practical and more attractive to achieve
information-theoretic secrecy in wireless networks by employing multiple transmit antennas
at the physical layer.
The authors of [45] investigated security of the physical layer of a system with multiple
inputs and multiple outputs, consisting of one source and one destination in the presence of
an interceptor, where each node is equipped with several antennas. Two schemes for selecting
a transmitting antenna (optimal antenna selection and sub-optimal antenna selection) are
considered, which work depending on whether the source has information about state of
the global channel as the main channel and the channel that is being listened to. For
performance comparison, a standard space-time transmission scheme is considered. The
expressions in a closed form for the probability of zero secrecy capacity for the spacetime transmission, optimal antenna selection and sub-optimal antenna selection schemes in
conditions of Rayleigh fading are obtained. It is shown that the generalized order of secrecy
diversity of the space-time transmission, sub-optimal antenna selection and optimal antenna
selection schemes are the product of the number of antennas at source and destination:

dOAS = dSAS = M Nd ,

where M and Nd represent the number of antennas at source and destination, respectively.
It has been experimentally shown that the optimal antenna selection scheme is superior to
both the sub-optimal antenna selection scheme and the space-time transmission scheme in
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terms of probability of zero secrecy, confirming the safety benefits of using optimal choice of
antennas against eavesdropping.

2.3

Importance of the Available CSI at Transmitter

Channel state information (CSI) is a collection of properties of a communication link. This
information describes how a signal propagates from the transmitter to receiver and represents
different effects of: scattering, fading, and power decay with distance. CSI makes it possible
to adapt transmissions to current channel conditions, which is crucial for achieving reliable
communication with high data rates in MIMO systems.
In general, the CSI can divided by two levels:
• Instantaneous CSI (or short-term CSI) defined by current channel conditions;
• Statistical CSI (or long-term CSI) defined by statistical characterization of the channel,
calculated over a long-term period.
It should also be noted that all information about the channel is concentrated on the
parameters gM , gE , nM and nE . As it is noted in the introduction, the systems belong to
one of two types:
• Full Channel CSI: In this case, the exact values of the parameters gM , gE are known.
Hence, these parameters have constant matrices.
• Partial Channel CSI: In this case, consider a system under uncertainty (partial information), namely assuming that the parameters are not constants, but are random
variables with some distribution.
Most of the real-world systems belong to the second type, since, it is impossible to
accurately determine parameters of the system. In this case, uncertainty of the system lies
in the assumption given by Eqn.(1.8).
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A. Mukherjee and A. L. Swindlehurst [23] have presented beam-forming based approaches
for improving the secrecy of wireless communications between two multi-antenna nodes
H
Qint = E{Hba z 0 z 0H Hba
+ nb nH
b }.

The algorithms allocate transmit power in order to achieve a target SINR for a desired
user, and then broadcast the remaining available power as artificial noise in order to disrupt
interception of the signal by a passive eavesdropper. The proposed approaches rely heavily on
availability of accurate CSI, and their performance can be quite sensitive leading to imprecise
channel estimates. As a result, the authors conducted a detailed second-order perturbation
analysis in order to precisely quantify the effects of inaccurate CSI. Simulations were used
to demonstrate validity of the analysis, and to illustrate the sensitivity of algorithms that
depend on precise CSI. To reduce impact of CSI errors, Mukherjee and Swindlehurst proposed
two robust beam-forming schemes that are able to recover a large fraction of the SINR lost
due to channel estimation errors. These techniques were shown to perform very well for
moderate CSI errors, but ultimately a large enough channel mismatch can eliminate the
secrecy advantage of using articial noise.

2.4

Literature Review

Consider now the main results, which are related to calculation CS in the models described
above.
Main goal of [12] is defining secrecy capacity for MIMO systems with complex-value
matrices gM and gE . Also, authors of this work have considered complex-valued noises
nM and nE – assuming nM , nE are independent CN (0, I) processes2 . For solving SC, the
authors have used generalized eigenvalues of two matrices (gM , gE ), which are defined as
solutions of the equation
det(gM − λgE ) = 0
2

CN (0, I) is a complex-valued Gaussian process with average 0 and covariance matrix I
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with corresponding eigenvectors. Main results of the article are focused on finding SC on
limit case (P → ∞). For example, the authors proved that limit value of secrecy capacity
for P → ∞ is approximately equal

CS ≈ C0 (P ) +

X

log(σj2 ) + O(1),

σj >0

where σj is generalized singular values of the (gM , gE ) problem. Also, the authors have
considered different cases for rank of the matrices gM and gE and proven that in some cases
0 and g 0 . This is a very informative result for
CS depends only on full-rank sub-matrices gM
E

a reducing partial-information system to a full-rank system.
The main focus of study [17] is MIMO systems, which can be described by complex-valued
generalization of the system given by Eqn.(1.1). Principal results of the work are based on
the novel global optimization algorithm called branch-and-bound with reformulation and
linearization technique. For simplification of the problem, authors have used the linearization
of log(x):
log(x) =

X

Ii (x)(ai x + bi ),

i∈Ind

where ai , bi are some constants, Ind is a subset of indexes. Using this method, authors
reduce the problem to a corresponding linear problem, which can also be obtained from
Taylor series:
log(1 + x) =

∞
X

(−1)i−1

i=1

xi
.
i

The results, obtained in [17] can be used for numerical calculation of SC, but not for
contained closed form of SC.
Authors of the work [26] have described the general state of the problem of finding the
secrecy capacity for different types of systems (SISO, MISO, MIMO) and define main ways
for finding the SC estimations for each of these systems. Authors have shown the existence
of the closed form for secrecy capacity only for two types of the system – SISO and SIMO
systems. Also, authors have used different definitions for the channel capacity for AWGN
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channel:
0
I(X) = log(det(I + ΣgM
gM )).

This representation changes the calculation of secrecy capacity, because
0
0
log(det(I + ΣgM
gM )) 6= log(det(I + gM
ΣgM )).

Thus, one can conclude that the closeness of secrecy capacity also depends on the form in
which its value is calculated.
The main work of [44] is the assessment of secrecy capacity for SISO systems. In Theorem
2 of this work, a closed form of secrecy capacity for a MISO system with uncorrelated noise
is given, which has the form

CS,M ISO =

M
X

CS,SISO (i),

i=1

where CS,SISO (i) is value of secrecy capacity between uncorrelated sub-channels (SISO
subsystems). The authors of these study have shown that the MIMO system with uncorrelated
noise can be considered as several unconnected SISO systems. At the same time, the authors
found a closed form of secrecy capacity for these systems. Also, the authors of this work
have considered the case of uncorrelated gM and gE and shown that the value of CS for
SISO system in limit case for P → ∞ can be estimated as

CS ≈

2
EgM
P
.
2 E(gM + gE )

Using the notation about joint distribution of gM and gE , this relation can be rewritten in
the form
CS ≈

P σ12 + µ21
,
2 µ1 + µ2

where gM ∼ N (µ1 , σ12 ), gE ∼ N (µ2 , σ22 ).
F. Oggier and B. Hassibi [24] considered the problem of computing perfect secrecy
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capacity of a multiple antenna channel, based on a generalization of the wire-tap channel to
a MIMO broadcast wire-tap channel. The model was described by the following broadcast
channel
Y = gM X + nM ,

Z = gE X + nE ,

where Y, nM and Z, nE are respectively k × 1 vectors. Besides, F. Oggier and B. Hassibi
have solved the optimization problem

min max I(X; Y |Z)
A

KX

by computing optimal A in a closed form expression, and by showing that optimal K X is
low rank.
T. Liu and S. Shamai [18] presented an alternative characterization using a channel
enhancement argument. They considered a canonical version of the channel (vector Gaussian
wiretap channel)
yr [m] = x[m] + wr [r],

ye [m] = x[m] + we [m],

where x[m] is the real input vector of length t, wr [m] and we [m] are additive Gaussian
noise vectors with zero mean and covariance matrices Kr and Ke , respectively, and are
independent across the index m. The noise covariance matrices Kr and Ke are assumed to
be positive definite. T. Liu and S. Shamai proved that, if there exists a positive semi-definite
matrix, then the secrecy capacity of a degraded vector Gaussian wiretap channel can be
written as
C=


 1


1
log det I + Kx∗ Kr−1 − log det I + Kx∗ Ke−1 .
2
2

The characterization relies on an extreme entropy inequality recently proved in the context
of multi-antenna broadcast channels, and is directly built on the physical intuition regarding
the optimal transmission strategy in this communication scenario.
G. Geraci et al [7] proposed a linear precoder for the down-link of a multi-user MIMO
system with multiple users that potentially act as eavesdroppers. The proposed precoder is
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based on regularized channel inversion (RCI) with a regularization parameter α and power
allocation vector chosen in such a way that the achievable secrecy sum-rate is maximized. The
authors considered worst-case scenario for multi-user MIMO system, where the transmitter
assumes users to co-operate to eavesdrop on other users

Rs =

K
X
k=1

"

log2

2
|h+
k wk |
1+
P
2
γσ 2 + j6=k |h+
k wj | |

!

− log2

||Hk wk ||2
1+
γσ 2

!#+

.

They derive the achievable secrecy sum rate and obtain closed-form expression for the
optimal regularization parameter αLS of the precoder using large-system analysis. Authors
showed that the RCI precoder with αLS outperforms several other linear precoding schemes,
and it achieves a secrecy sum-rate that has same scaling factor as the sum-rate achieved
by optimum RCI precoder without secrecy requirements. Geraci et al proposed a power
allocation algorithm to maximize the secrecy sum-rate for fixed α. They then extend the
algorithm to maximize the secrecy sum-rate by jointly optimizing α and the power allocation
vector. The jointly optimized precoder outperforms RCI with αLS and equal power allocation
by up to 20 percent at practical values of the signal-to-noise ratio and for 4 users and 4
transmit antennas.
In [4], the new analytical and closed expressions for the probability of a strictly positive
secrecy capacity and a lower bound for secure outage probability for the recently proposed
κ − µ fading model were presented. In particular, analytical expressions were obtained
for i.i.d. channel coefficients without parameter limitations. Analytical and closed-form
expressions were tested by reducing to known particular cases and Monte-Carlo simulations.
Since the proposed κ − µ fading model is a very general statistical model that includes many
well-known distributions, in the article, the authors obtained new equations that can be
used to characterize the secrecy of several different attenuation channels and calculating the
probability of failures in wireless systems subject to co-channel interference and background
noise, and calculation of the probability of failures in scenarios with limited interference.
The utility of new formulations has been illustrated by examining the probability of strictly
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positive secrecy capacity and a lower bound of secure outage selectivity based on actual
channel measurements conducted for a diverse range of wireless applications such as cellular
device-to-device, peer-to-peer, vehicle-to-vehicle and body-centric fading channels.

2.5

Summary

Secrecy capacity is one of the most important indicators that characterizes the reliability of
the MIMO3 system. However, at present, there are few major problems that prevent the
calculation of this indicator to be simplified:
• Absence of a closed form for secrecy capacity CS for the MIMO system.
• Absence of a closed form for secrecy capacity CS for an arbitrary system with correlated
channels.
The absence of a closed form for secrecy capacity causes the construction of methods for
approximation of CS . Most works [8, 9, 35, 37, 42] use the Monte Carlo method for this
aim. However, this method, as a statistical method, is very slow. Therefore, other methods
should be used to improve the results. The following table lists the main methods used to
evaluate CS .

3

Or SISO, SIMO, MISO systems
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Study
Zang et al [44]

System
Uncorrelated MIMO and
correlated SISO

Sedighizad et al [32]

Uncorrelated SISO

Schaefer et al [31]

Uncorrelated MIMO

Shu et al [34]

Uncorrelated MIMO

Liu & Poor [28]

Uncorrelated MIMO

Khisti & Wornell [12]

Uncorrelated MIMO

Li & Petropulu [16]

Uncorrelated MISO

Description
Estimate CS,M IM O of
MIMO system by CS,SISO
of the SISO subsystems.
Find estimation of the
SISO system in terms of
moments of gM and gE in
limit case P → ∞
Estimation of ∆CS by
∆gM and ∆gE . Novel
approach for estimation of
CS by DE
Find closed form of the CS
for composite Gaussian
MIMO listening channel
with specific form of
channel gains gM and gE
Considered effect of
stochastic interference on
the fundamental structure
of the CS in MIMO system
Define upper and lower
bounds for CS by
computable Sato-type outer
bounds
Estimation of the CS by
singular values of (gM , gE )
in limit case P → ∞
Find a closed form of CS
for MISO system with
additional conditions for
channel gains

Table 2.1: Main results of estimation of CS for different system
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Chapter 3

Fading Gaussian Wiretap Channel with Correlation of Channel Gains

3.1

Non-Convexity of the Secrecy Capacity Expression

The main task of finding the optimal distribution between channels in the MIMO system is
to maximize Eqn.(1.6). For systems considered in this research, the given problem can be
rewritten in the following form:

CS =

1
0
0
sup (log(det(I + gM
ΣgM )) − log(det(I + gE
ΣgE ))),
2 tr(Σ)≤P

(3.1)

Let’s define the optimization problem by matrix Σ, under the constraint tr(Σ) ≤ P . The
above Eqn.(3.1) is related to Non-Convex optimization problems. Thus, it is impossible to
use standard methods of convex optimization for finding the solution for a given task. In
addition, the closed form of the solution can only be found in critical cases for k = m = 1 or
n = 1.
J. Li, A. Petropulu [16] have investigated the problem of finding the optimal input
covariance matrix that achieves secrecy capacity subject to a power constraint. For general
cases, the authors derive the necessary conditions for the optimal solution consisting of a
set of equations. For the case in which transmitter has two antennas, the derived necessary
conditions can result in a closed form solution. If the difference is indefinite and has all
negative eigenvalues except one positive eigenvalue, they prove that the optimal input
covariance matrix has rank one and can be obtained in closed form. For other cases, Li and
Petropulu prove that the solution is a fixed point of mapping from a convex set to itself and
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provide an iterative procedure to search for it.
MIMO network is a more complicated system and there is no closed form for determination
of secrecy capacity for this system. In this case, authors have found many different ways to
estimate SC for MIMO systems. One of the most used methods is the Monte Carlo method,
which allows to determine precisely the secrecy capacity. But it should be noted that this
method, although it is the most effective for MIMO systems, has a low efficiency if used for
Massive MIMO systems (Ma-MIMO).

3.2

Bounds on Secrecy Capacity over Correlated Fading Channels with
Full CSI

As noted in the previous section, for MIMO systems, there is no closed form for secrecy
capacity. Therefore, in this case, one can either find estimation of the secrecy capacity using
statistical methods (for example, the Monte Carlo method) or build bounds of the secrecy
capacity, using properties of the function log and determinant of the matrix. Let’s consider
a few results, which corresponds to finding Upper Bound for MIMO systems with correlated
gains for different regimes. One of the simplest of these bounds can be found from the
relations:

log(1 + x) ∼ x, x → 0.

log(1 + x) ∼ log(x), x → ∞;
Using these simple relations, the estimation for SC for critical values of SNR (SN R → 0
or SN R → ∞) can be built. In the first case from Eqn. (3.1)

CS ≈

0
0
sup (det(gM
ΣgM ) − det(gE
ΣgE )).

tr(Σ)≤P
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In the second case

CS ≈

0
0
sup (log(det(gM
ΣgM )) − log(det(gE
ΣgE ))).

tr(Σ)≤P

Main aim of [8] is the calculation of SC for correlated channels with exponential and
Rayleigh distributions. For the exponential distribution CS is calculated in closed form for
P → ∞:
CSlim (exp)

1
4(1 − ρ)Φ(u)
,
= log −
2
κu




where Φ(u) is given in [8]. The same result for P → ∞ is given for Rayleigh distribution:

CSlim (Ray)

1
+
2

= log(1 + κ) + log

s

1
ρκ
−
4 (1 + κ)2

!

.

The authors of the study [9] have got the same results as the authors of the work [8]
about limit distribution for P → ∞ for exponential and Rayleigh distribution.
The research [37] considers correlated Rayleigh distribution, and the authors define
secrecy capacity by next relation:

CS = E(log(1 + γM P (γM , γE )) − log(1 + γE P (γM , γE ))),

where

P (γM , γE ) =

  r 
+


4

0.5
ψ
+
ψ
−
0.5φ
, if γE > 0,


λ


i
h







where ψ =

1
γE

−

1
γM ,

φ=

1
γE

+

1
γM .

1
λ

−

1
γE

, if γE = 0,

0, otherwise,
The authors of this research have defined the upper

bound limits for secrecy capacity of correlated Rayleigh distribution.
In the research [39], authors have defined secrecy capacity for log-normal correlated
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channels. In this case, authors prove that limit secrecy capacity for P → ∞ is defined as

CSlim =

Q
[FY (y)]∞
µE ,
ξ

where constants Q, ξ and function FY (y) are defined in the paper.
Note that the papers [8, 9, 35, 37, 38] describes SISO systems. The research [41] describes
case of the vectors’ gE and gM normal distribution. In this case the distribution of vectors’
gE and gM have χ2 distributions. Hence, the authors of this paper have calculated results
for the SISO system with correlated χ2 distributions. Also, the authors have not got a closed
form for secrecy capacity, but defined CS as a series. This result can be used for estimation
of CS by finite sum.
The main achievement of the research [9] is the calculation of boundaries for the secrecy
capacity for MIMO system with correlated ergodic fading channels at high SNR. This paper
is a continuation of work [10], in which the authors in detail have described the bounds for
realizations of complex Gaussian random processes gM and gE . In particular, they have
proved that the closed form for upper bound of CS for limit case P → ∞, ρ → 1 exists and
can be expressed as
lim C + P (k, ρ) =

ρ→1



 log(k), k > 1,



0, k ≤ 0,

where k is defined by fraction of two channels’ average values:

k=

EgM
.
EgE

The main result of this study shows a relation between secrecy capacity for SISO systems
for different values of ρ in the limit case P → ∞:

(1 − ρ)CS (k, 0) ≤ CS (k, ρ) ≤ CS (k, 0).

This result can be chosen only for high regime SNR, because for low regime SNR and when
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|ρ| < 1 by definition of the joint distribution

CS (k, ρ) > 0

∀k.

S. Shafiee, N. Liu and S. Ulukus [29] determined the secrecy capacity of the 2-2-1 Gaussian
MIMO wire-tap channel, which is characterized by Eqn.(1.1) by solving for the optimum
joint distribution for the auxiliary random variable and the channel input in the Csiszar –
Korner formula. They projected a lower bound on the secrecy capacity by evaluating the
Csiszar-Korner formula for a specific selection of the auxiliary random variable and the
channel input. However, for some case, authors have shown that the optimal transmission
scheme is unit-rank, i.e., beam-forming is optimal. Shafiee, Liu and Ulukus showed the
optimality of the proposed achievable scheme by constructing a tight upper bound that
meets it
max

S≥0:tr(S)≤P

U (S, a)

for any a with ||a|| < 1, where U (S, a) is defined as
T

1
|I + N −1 HSH |
U (S, a) = log
.
2
(1 + g T Sg)
The upper bound is developed by considering the secrecy capacity of a channel where the
eavesdroppers signal is given to the legitimate receiver. Even though this upper bound
is well-defined for a general MIMO wire-tap channel, explicit estimation and tightening
of this upper bound has been possible by restricting ourselves to the 2-2-1 case. For the
lower-bound, by selecting a certain correlation structure for additive noises, they have shown
that beam-forming is optimal for the upper bound as well. Furthermore, authors have shown
that optimal beam-forming directions in the lower and upper bounds are the same. Finally,
Shafiee, Liu and Ulukus have shown that two bounds meet yielding the secrecy capacity.
Their derivation is specific to the 2-2-1 case and they have not been able to show that these
lower and upper bounds meet in the general MIMO channel. This is because the unit-rank
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(beam-forming) property of the optimum transmit matrices is essential in the derivations,
while beam-forming is not likely to be the optimal strategy when the number of transmit
and receive antennas is more than two.
E. Ekrem and S. Ulukus [6] characterized the secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian
MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel. They showed the achievable rate with a variant of
dirty-paper coding with Gaussian signals
m
X

µk Σ∗k −

k=1

m
X

µk Σk ≥ 0.

k=1

Before reaching this result, the authors first visited the scalar case, and showed the necessity
of a new proof for the converse. In particular, they showed that the extensions of existing
converses for the Gaussian scalar broadcast channels fall short of resolving the ambiguity
regarding the auxiliary random variables. E. Ekrem and S. Ulukus showed that, unlike
the stand-alone use of the entropy-power inequality, the use of relationships either between
MMSE and mutual information or between Fisher information and differential entropy
resolves this ambiguity. Extending this methodology to degraded vector channels, they
found the secrecy capacity region of the degraded Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap
channel,
k
k
i=1 Ki +
k
i=1 Ki +
Z
1
1
−
, k = 1, K,
Σk ≤ log P
log
P
P
P
k−1
k−1
2
2
Ki +
Ki +

P

i=1

P

P

k

i=1

P

Z

where the union is over all positive semi-definite matrices Ki K
i=1 that satisfy
K
X

Ki = S.

i=1

Once they obtained the secrecy capacity region of the degraded MIMO channel, they
generalized it to arbitrary channels by using the channel enhancement method and some
limiting arguments.
A scenario where a source node wishes to broadcast two confidential messages for two
respective receivers via a Gaussian MIMO broadcast channel, while a wire-tapper also receives
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the transmitted signal via another MIMO channel is considered by Bagherikaram, Motahari
and Khandani [1]. They considered the secure vector Gaussian degraded broadcast channel
and established its capacity region. Their achievable scheme was the secret superposition of
Gaussian codes. Instead of solving a non-convex problem, the authors used the notion of an
enhanced channel to show that secret superposition of Gaussian codes is optimal – convex
hull of the closure of all (Σ1 , Σ2 ) satisfying

Σ1 ≤ I(X; Y1 |U ) − I(X; Z|U ),

Σ2 ≤ I(U ; Y2 ) − I(U ; Z).

for the joint distribution P (u)P (x|u)P (y1 , y2 , z|x).
To characterize secrecy capacity region of the vector Gaussian degraded broadcast channel,
they only enhanced the channels for legitimate receivers, and channel of the eavesdropper
remained unchanged. Then, Bagherikaram et al have extended the result of the degraded
case to the non-degraded case. The authors showed that the secret superposition of Gaussian
codes along with successive decoding cannot work when the channels are not degraded
and developed a Secret Dirty Paper Coding (SDPC) scheme and showed that SDPC is
optimal for this channel. They investigated practical characterizations for the specic scenario
in which the transmitter and the eavesdropper can afford multiple antennas, while both
intended receivers have a single antenna. The authors characterized the secrecy capacity
region in terms of generalized eigenvalues of the receivers’ channel and the eavesdropper
channel. For high SNR they showed that the capacity region is a convex closure of two
rectangular regions.
The research [3] is devoted to integral representations for finding the density and
distribution function for the class of multi-dimensional Rayleigh and Rician distributions
with a generalized correlation structure:
- Rayleigh CDF
Z∞

F (r1 , r2 , ..., rN ) =
0



√ q



t ρ2k rk
1 − Q 
exp (−t)
,  dt,
σk
σk
k=1
N
Y
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where ρk is the correlation coefficient, σ 2 =

1−ρ2k
2 ,

Q is 1st order Marcum Q-function;

- Rician CDF
Z∞

F (ω1 , ω2 , ..., ωN ) =


 √q
exp (−t) exp(−(m21 + m22 ))I0 2 t m21 + m22

0

√ q





t ρ2k ω


1−Q
×
,  dt,
σ
σk
k
k=1
N
Y

where m1 and m2 are means of two Gaussian distributions.
It should be noted that for this solution the computational complexity does not increase
with the number of correlated RVs. In addition, CDF is computed directly and with one
integration that does not require multiple (N for N-dimensional distribution) integrations
to calculate CDF from PDF. To verify the accuracy of the theoretical results, numerical
simulation results were used.

3.3

Expected Secrecy Capacity with Correlation of Channel Gains: Using
PDE

3.3.1

SISO Systems

In this section, let’s try to reduce the calculation of secrecy capacity using Partial Differential
equations (PDE). Assume that the average value of SC is equal to
Z

CS =

C(h1 , h2 )f (h1 , h2 )dh,

(3.2)

R2

where dh = dh1 dh2 , f (h1 , h2 ) is the joint density for channel gains (gM , gE ), C(h1 , h2 ) is the
secrecy capacity for system with given level of h1 and h2 . Most authors use the following
definition of the function C(h1 , h2 ):
C(h1 , h2 ) = (log(1 + h01 Σh1 ) − log(1 + h02 Σh2 ))+ ,

(3.3)
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In this subsection for simplification, the case n = m = k = 1 is described.
Consider the case of normal distribution of the signals for

f (h1 , h2 ) =

where

1
1
0 −1
e− 2 (h−µ) Σ (h−µ) ,
2π det(Σ)












 µ1 
 h1 
,Σ = 
,µ = 

h=

µ2

h2

(3.4)

p



σ12

ρσ1 σ2 

.

σ22

ρσ1 σ2

(3.5)

Now let’s find the partial derivative of CS by µi , i = 1, 2:
∂CS
=
∂µi

Z

C(h1 , h2 )
R2

∂
f (h1 , h2 )dh.
∂µi

(3.6)

Consider term under the integral :
∂
∂
1
f (h1 , h2 ) = f (h1 , h2 )
− (h − µ)0 Σ−1 (h − µ) =
∂µi
∂µi
2












−f (h1 , h2 ) Ii Σ−1 (h − µ) =
f (h1 , h2 ) Ii Σ−1 (µ − h) ,
∂
∂
1
f (h1 , h2 ) = f (h1 , h2 )
− (h − µ)0 Σ−1 (h − µ) =
∂ρ
∂ρ
2




f (h1 , h2 )





σ1−2

∂ 
1

(h − µ)0 
−
∂ρ
2(1 − ρ2 )
−ρσ1−1 σ2−1


f (h1 , h2 ) −




σ1−2

ρ

(h − µ)0 
2
2
(1 − ρ )
−ρσ1−1 σ2−1

−ρσ1−1 σ2−1
σ2−2
−ρσ1−1 σ2−1
σ2−2

1
(h1 − µ1 )(h2 − µ2 )σ1−1 σ2−1 f (h1 , h2 ),
1 − ρ2







 (h − µ) =







 (h − µ) +
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where vector Ii contains all 0s except i-th elements, which is 1. Using these calculations,
∂CS
=
∂µi

= Ii Σ

−1

Z

Z



R2

C(h1 , h2 )f (h1 , h2 )dh − Ii Σ

µ



C(h1 , h2 )f (h1 , h2 ) Ii Σ−1 (µ − h) dh

−1

R2

Z

C(h1 , h2 )f (h1 , h2 )hdh
R2

Z

= Ii Σ−1 µCS − Ii Σ−1

C(h1 , h2 )f (h1 , h2 )hdh.
R2

Note that,


Σ−1 =

σ22

1


(1 − ρ2 )σ12 σ22
−ρσ1 σ2



−ρσ1 σ2 


σ12




−ρσ1−1 σ2−1 
σ1−2
1 
=


1 − ρ2
−ρσ1−1 σ2−1
σ2−2
and
I1 Σ−1 =

1
1 − ρ2



I2 Σ−1 =

1
1 − ρ2



σ1−2 ,

−ρσ1−1 σ2−1

−ρσ1−1 σ2−1 ,

σ2−2



,


.

Assuming the parameters σ1 , σ2 , ρ are fixed. In this case,
∂CS
= 0.
∂ρ
There exists a function g(σ1 , σ2 , ρ) for which
I1 Σ−1

Z

C(h1 , h2 )f (h1 , h2 )hdh+
R2

g(σ1 , σ2 , ρ)I2 Σ

−1

Z

C(h1 , h2 )f (h1 , h2 )hdh = 0.

(3.7)

R2

Consider calculation of the value of function g(σ1 , σ2 , ρ) by Eqn (3.7). Using this equation
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and definitions of Ii , the next equality is obtained
I1 Σ−1

Z

C(h1 , h2 )f (h1 , h2 )hdh =
R2

1
1 − ρ2



σ1−2 ,

−ρσ1−1 σ2−1



(H1 , H2 )0 =


1  −2
−1 −1
σ
H
−
ρσ
σ
,
H
1
2
1
2
1 − ρ2 1

where
Z

C(h1 , h2 )f (h1 , h2 )hi dh.

Hi =
R2

Similar results are obtained for the second term from Eqn. (3.7):

I2 Σ

−1

Z

C(h1 , h2 )f (h1 , h2 )hdh =
R2

1
1 − ρ2



−ρσ1−1 σ2−1 ,

σ2−2



(H1 , H2 )0 =


1 
−1 −1
−2
−ρσ
σ
H
+
σ
H
1
2 .
1
2
2
1 − ρ2

Substituting these values in Eqn.(3.7),

g(σ1 , σ2 , ρ) =

σ1−2 H1 − ρσ1−1 σ2−1 H2
=
ρσ1−1 σ2−1 H1 − σ2−2 H2

rH1 − ρH2
,
ρH1 − r−1 H2

(3.8)

where r = σ2 σ1−1 . Now, using this equation and Eqn. (3.6), it is easy to find PDE for CS
for different values of the averages (µ1 , µ2 ).
∂CS
∂CS
+ g(σ1 , σ2 , ρ)
= Ii Σ−1 µCS + g(σ1 , σ2 , ρ)Ii Σ−1 µCS =
∂µ1
∂µ2
i
CS h  −2
−1 −1
µ
σ
−
gρσ
σ
+ µ2 (gσ2−2 − ρσ1−1 σ2−1 ).
1
1
1
2
1 − ρ2
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Using the above relation, main PDE for CS can be defined in the next form
∂CS
∂CS
+g
= (u1 µ1 + u2 µ2 )CS ,
∂µ1
∂µ2

(3.9)



 u1 = σ −2 − gρσ −1 σ −1 ,
1
1
2

−2
−1 −1


(3.10)

where

u2 = gσ2 − ρσ1 σ2 .

Now, consider the bound conditions for CS . For this case, using the relation
Z

Z

C(h1 + µ1 , h2 + µ2 )f0,Σ (h1 , h2 )dh

C(h1 , h2 )fµ,Σ (h1 , h2 )dh =
R2

R2

Therefore, with µi → ∞ needed boundary values, the limit conditions can be calculated as
Z

lim CS = lim

µ1 →∞

µ1 →∞
R2

Z

= lim

µ1 →∞
R2

C(h1 + µ1 , h2 + µ2 )f0,Σ (h1 , h2 )dh

log(1 + R(h1 + µ1 ))f0,Σ (h1 , h2 )dh = ∞;

Z

lim CS = lim

µ2 →∞

µ2 →∞
R2

C(h1 + µ1 , h2 + µ2 )f0,Σ (h1 , h2 )dh

Z

= lim

µ2 →∞
R2

0f0,Σ (h1 , h2 )dh = 0.

Hence, the main task for finding CS can be rewritten in the form of PDE:

∂CS
∂CS



∂µ1 + g ∂µ2 = (u1 µ1 + u2 µ2 )CS ;




lim CS = ∞;
µ1 →∞







(3.11)

lim CS = 0.

µ2 →∞

Note that the boundary conditions defined for the PDE in Eqn.(3.11) cannot be used,
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because there multiple functions satisfying the Eqn.(3.11). For constricting the estimation
of the solution, defined by Eqn. (3.11), the next form will be used:


∂CS

S

+ g ∂C

∂µ2 = (u1 µ1 + u2 µ2 )CS ;

 ∂µ1

CS |µ1 =0 = b2 (µ2 );







(3.12)

CS |µ2 =0 = b1 (µ1 ).

Now, consider an algorithm for the secrecy capacity CS estimation for correlated channel
gains gM , gE , the distribution of which is defined by Eqn. (3.4).
Algorithm 3.1
Step 1. Define grid of the points ηi,j = (µ1,i , µ2,j ) where

µ1,i = µ1,0 + step1 ∗ i;

µ2,j = µ2,0 + step2 ∗ j.
Step 2. Calculate the values of Hi :
Z

Hi =

C(h1 , h2 )f (h1 , h2 )hi dh
R2

for the bounds of the grid.
Step 3. Calculate value of the function g, defined in Eqn. (3.8).
Step 4. Define bound conditions for secrecy capacity CS in the bounds of the grid –
these are points CS,i,0 and CS,0,j , where

CS,i,j = CS (ηij ).

Step 5. Calculate the functions u1 and u2 , defined in the Eqn. (3.10).
Step 6. Calculate estimation of the secrecy capacity by first equation in Eqn. (3.11).
Using the estimation of derivative by finite difference in the points ηij , the next estimation
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is found:
CS,i,j =

step2 CS,(i−1),j + step1 v2,i,j CS,i,j−1
,
step2 + v2,i,j step1 − step1 step2 v0,i,j

where





v0 = g;


 v =u µ +u µ .
2
1 1
2 2

3.3.2

MIMO Systems

In previous subsection, SISO systems was considered. In this section, the case of MIMO
system will be considered. For simplicity, consider the case of a system with

n = k = m = 2.

In this case matrix Σ have dimension 8 × 8 and is next form




 ΣM

Σ=

Σ

0
M,E

ΣM,E 
ΣE

,

where matrices ΣM , ΣM,E , ΣE are next:





ΣM = 





2
σM,1

0

0

2
σM,2

0

0

0

0

2
σM,3

0

0

0

0

2
σM,4



0

 ρ1 σM,1 σE,1


 ρ5 σM,2 σE,1
ΣM,E = 

 ρ σ
 9 M,3 σE,1


0













 , ΣE = 









2
σE,1

0

0

2
σE,2

0

0

0

0

2
σE,3

0

0

0

0

2
σE,4

0

0













ρ2 σM,1 σE,2

ρ3 σM,1 σE,3

ρ4 σM,1 σE,4 

ρ6 σM,2 σE,2

ρ7 σM,2 σE,3

ρ8 σM,2 σE,4 


ρ10 σM,3 σE,2 ρ11 σM,3 σE,3







ρ12 σM,3 σE,4 



ρ13 σM,4 σE,1 ρ14 σM,4 σE,2 ρ15 σM,4 σE,3 ρ16 σM,4 σE,4

Assume that the channel gains for any channel (except gM and gE ) are uncorrelated, so
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matrices ΣM and ΣE are diagonal matrices. Vector of average values for the channel gains
gM and gE is (µ1 , ..., µ8 ), where µi is defined from next relation








 µ 1 µ2 

 µ 5 µ6 

µ 3 µ4

µ7 µ8

E(gM ) = 

 , E(gE ) = 

.

Hence, number of parameters in this MIMO system is

N = 8 + 8 + 16 = 24.

Using previous forms of µ, Σ and ρ, we can calculate partial derivatives of secrecy capacity
CS by all parameters:





∂ 
∂CS
=
∂µi
∂µi

Z

CS (h)fµ,Σ (h)dh =

R8

−

1
2

Z

CS (h)fµ,Σ (h)
R8

Z


∂ 
(h − µ)0 Σ−1 (h − µ) dh =
∂µi




CS (h)fµ,Σ (h) Ii Σ−1 (h − µ) dh,

R8

where Ii is vector which contain only 0s except ith position with value 1. Using definition of
Ii , next relation is true:
Ii Σ−1 (h − µ) = Ii Σ−1 H − CS ∗ (Ii Σ−1 µ),

where vector H defined as in previous subsection:
Z

Hi =

CS (h)f (h)hi dh, i = 1, ..., 8.
R8

Now consider the construction of PDE as in previous subsection. First define functions
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gi , which depend from parameters σk , k = 1, ..., 8 and ρj , j = 1, ..., 16 for which
G0 Σ−1 H = 0,

(3.13)

where vector G = (g1 , ...., g8 ). Eqn.(3.13) has more than 1 solution for MIMO system, hence
we can use any of them. For example, consider next solution of Eqn. (3.13) in the form
G = (g1 , g2 , 0, ..., 0). Using this form of vector G, we get system of two linear equations with
two unknown variables g1 and g2 .
After defining vector G, it is easy to construct a system of PDE in the next form
8
X

Gi

i=1

∂CS
= GΣ−1 H − CS ∗ (GΣ−1 µ) =
∂µi
−CS ∗ (GΣ−1 µ)

Using this equation, define estimation of the secrecy capacity CS in the point ui1 ,...,i8 in the
space µ ∈ R8 :
CS,k1 ,....,k8 ∗ (GΣ−1 µ) ≈ −

8
X

Gi

i=1

∆i CS,k1 ,....,k8
.
∆i

Using forward approximation of ∆i CS,k1 ,....,k8 1 , we get
CS,k1 ,....,k8 ∗ (GΣ−1 µ) ≈ −

8
X

Gi

i=1

−

8
X

Gi

i=1

∆i CS,k1 ,....,k8
=
∆i

CS,k1 ,....,k8 − δi CS,k1 ,....,k8
.
∆i

Solving this equation by CS,k1 ,....,k8 :

CS,k1 ,....,k8 ∗ GΣ

−1

µ+

8
X
i=1

!

Gi ∆−1
i

=

8
X
i=1

Gi

δi CS,k1 ,....,k8
.
∆i

1

∆1 CS,k1 ,....,k8 = CS,k1 −1,k2 ,...,i8 − CS,k1 ,k2 ,...,k8 ,
∆2 CS,k1 ,....,k8 = CS,k1 ,k2 −1,...,k8 − CS,k1 ,k2 ,...,k8 , ...

(3.14)
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Algorithm 3.2
Step 1. Define grid of the points ηi,j = (µ1,k1 , µ2,k2 , ..., µ8,k8 ) , where

µj,kj = µj,0 + stepj ∗ kj ;

Step 2. Calculate the values of Hi :
Z

Hi =

C(h)f (h)hi dh, i = 1, ..., 8.
R8

for the bounds of the grid in the space R8 .
Step 3. Calculate value the elements of vector G from Eqn. (3.13).
Step 4. Define bound conditions for secrecy capacity CS in the bounds of the grid –
these are points CS,k1 ,...,k8 , where min(k1 , ..., k8 ) = 0.
Step 5. Calculate estimation of the secrecy capacity in the point (µ1,k1 , ..., µ8,k8 ), using
the estimation of derivative by finite difference – Eqn. (3.14):

CS,k1 ,....,k8 =

GΣ

−1

µ+

8
X
i=1

Gi ∆−1
i

!−1 8
X
i=1

Gi

δi CS,k1 ,....,k8
.
∆i

by solving system of the linear equations with unknown values CS,k1 ,....,k8 .
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Chapter 4

Theoretical & Numerical Results

4.1

Expected Secrecy Capacity with Correlation of Channel Gains using
Monte-Carlo Method

Consider one result for SISO system with correlated channel gains. Assume that the two
channel gains gM and gE satisfy next relation

gE = ρgM +

q

1 − ρ2 U nc,

where ρ is correlation coefficient, U nc is some function (matrix valued function), which
does not depend on gM . Therefore, two critical cases (ρ = ±1) must give secrecy capacity
0. These theoretical conclusions are also confirmed by calculations made on basis of the
Monte-Carlo method (Fig. 4.1). From Fig. 4.1, it is obvious that the maximal secrecy
capacity is obtained for large values of SN R and small values of ρ.
As we see, the presence of correlation between channel gains can greatly vary the secrecy
capacity. In Fig. 4.1, the secrecy capacity decreases if correlation coefficient between channel
gains goes from ρ = 0 to ρ = ±1. In addition, the secrecy capacity is symmetric with respect
to the line ρ = 0. This property of secrecy capacity is a simple corollary for the SISO systems
for values averaging over zero. In addition, it will be shown that secrecy capacity depends
on the parameters of the system – (ρ, µ, Σ) in the next section.
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Figure 4.1: Contour plot of Secrecy Capacity as function of correlation ρ and SN R

Note that all the contour plots and graphs in this chapter are plotted using the color
scale as dark blue to light yellow for ascending values of the Secrecy Capacity. Each plot
has its own color bar and the limits for Secrecy Capacity are defined on this color bar.
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4.2

Comparison of Expected Secrecy Capacity using Monte-Carlo method
& PDE for Correlated Channel Gains

Consider the calculation result of the secrecy capacity CS for SISO systems with the next
parameters:
σ1 = 1; σ2 = 2;
ρ ∈ {−1, −0.2, 0, 0.1, 0.8, 1};
P = 1; step1 = step2 = 0.2;
µ1 , µ2 ∈ [0, 10]; Iterations = 103 .
From the Fig. 4.2 and Fig. 4.3, the difference between the approximations received of
secrecy capacity for two solutions is not more than 10−3 . These results indicates the high
accuracy of the proposed model (Eqn. (3.12)).
Also consider speed of the proposed algorithms for different number of iterations in the
Monte-Carlo method. For this consider the times needed for calculating estimation of CS by
two methods for different number of iterations. From resulting Tab. 4.1, execution time
Number of iteration
102
103
104

Execution time MC (sec.)
51
344
3225

Execution time PDE (sec.)
3
14
147

Table 4.1: Execution time for MC and PDE algorithms

of the Monte-Carlo algorithm is much slower than the corresponding execution time for
the algorithm using PDE. Therefore, there is no doubt that the described algorithm can
be applied to higher dimensions (n > 1, m > 1, k > 1) with an increase in the efficiency
than the classical Monte-Carlo algorithm. Also, we can calculate execution time for the
Monte-Carlo method for number of iterations equal 105 – this time is approximately 13123
sec (about 3.5 hours). Difference operators have been applied only for the function fµ,Σ .
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Figure 4.2: Contour plot of the secrecy capacity CS as function of the parameters (µ1 , µ2 )
calculated by MC method

It is also possible for the function C(h1 , h2 ) with the help of the next integration by
substitution:
Z

CS =

C(h1 , h2 )f (h1 , h2 )dh =
R2
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Figure 4.3: Contour plot of the secrecy capacity CS as function of the parameters (µ1 , µ2 )
calculated by PDE from Eqn. (3.12)
Z

C(ϕ(u))f (ϕ(u))det(D(ϕ(u)))du,
R2
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where the substitution h = ϕ(u) and Jacobian of the substitution D(ϕ(u)) are defined as

1

 h = ϕ(u) = µ + Σ 2 u



1

,

D(ϕ(u)) = Σ 2

1

where Σ 2 defines a square root from positive-defined matrix. Using this substitution, the
next equality is true:
f (ϕ(u)) = f0,I (u)
This means that the term f (ϕ(u)) does not depend on system parameters par = (ρ, µ1 , µ2 , σ1 , σ2 ).
Hence,
∂CS
=
∂pari

Z

f (ϕ(u))
R2

∂
(C(ϕ(u))det(D(ϕ(u)))) du
∂pari

This trick helps to simplify the calculations, because
∂
(C(ϕ(u))) det(D(ϕ(u)))
∂pari
is a rational function.
Now consider the result for estimation of the value of secrecy capacity CS as function
from σ1 , σ2 and ρ, where other parameters (µ1 , µ2 ) = (0, 0). Results of calculations we can
see in the Fig. 4.4. As we can see from this figure, values of the secrecy capacity is almost
same for values of correlation ρ near ±1. This result respond for the same theoretical result
about values of the secrecy capacity CS . The other interesting result is that secrecy capacity
increased for value µ = 0 when ρ → 1 and decreased when ρ → ±1.
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Figure 4.4: Contour plot of the secrecy capacity CS as function of the parameters (σ1 , σ2 ) ∈
[0, 10]2 calculated by PDE

Now consider the different scenarios of line-of-sight propagation and how it affects the
values for secrecy capacity CS for 3 pairs of the parameters (µ1 , µ2 ) with same values of the
(σ1 , σ2 ) = (1, 1) with varying SNR to the receiver and constant SNR to the eavesdropper
shown by Fig. 4.5 and Fig. 4.6 below.
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Figure 4.5: Contour plot of the secrecy capacity CS as function of the parameters (ρ, SN R) ∈
[−1, 1] × [0, 5] for different values of (µ1 , µ2 ) and for constant SNR at the Eavesdropper

These are the scenarios for the calculation of CS when SNR to the legitimate receiver is
varying. As we can see from Fig. 4.5, and Fig. 4.6, values of the secrecy capacity CS have
interesting relation with level of SNR. These relations also depend on other parameters of
the system – µ1 , µ2 , σ1 , σ2 . From the three plots, the maximal values of secrecy capacity CS
for any given value of SNR for the legitimate receiver is near ρ = 0. This can also be seen in
the Fig. 4.1. Even when the noise energy is better at the eavesdropper, we get a maximum
Secrecy Capacity of around 0.32 when ρ → 0 in Fig. 4.6 shown below.
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Figure 4.6: Contour plot of the secrecy capacity CS as function of the parameters (ρ, SN R) ∈
[−1, 1] × [0, 5] for the values (µ1 = 0, µ2 = 1) and for constant SNR at the Eavesdropper

Now, consider the below plot as an example, with both the receiver and the eavesdropper
having N-LOS propagation which is shown in Fig. 4.7. The SNR is varied from −5dB to
5dB. It is observed that the contour plot is symmetrical and the secrecy capacity increases
for when ρ → 0 and goes to a maximum of around 0.6 and decreases symmetrically when
ρ → ±1. Hence, all the three plots show that secure communication is possible when the
legitimate and eavesdropper channels have correlated gains when the SNR is varying at the
legitimate receiver and constant at the eavesdropper.
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Figure 4.7: Contour plot of Secrecy Capacity as function of correlation ρ and signal-to-noise
ratio SN R for N-LOS propagation with varying SNR at the receiver and constant SNR at
the eavesdropper
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Chapter 5

Conclusions

The Secrecy Capacity is determined for correlated channel gains for the main and eavesdropper channels in the Gaussian Wiretap channel. It was assumed that the system’s
secrecy capacity (Alice, Bob, Eve) is a continuously differential function from the system
parameters: ρi – the coefficients of correlations between elements of channel gains gM and
gE ; the elements of the vector µ and the matrix Σ, which represent average values and
covariance matrix of the channel gains (gM , gE ), respectively. Under conditions of normal
distribution of parameters (gM , gE ), a system in partial differential equations for the secrecy
capacity, which describes the changes of CS in space of the parameters (ρ, µ, Σ), is obtained.
The new algorithm has a higher speed than analog algorithms constructed on the classical
statistical Monte Carlo methods.
Important scenarios in which there is line-of-sight and non-line-of-sight propagation are
considered and numerically solved for the Secrecy Capacity for correlated channel gains. It
was identified that secure communication is possible with correlation of channel gains and
those scenarios were plotted.
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5.1

Future Work

In the future works, it is planned to improve the results by considering additional scenarios
using Rayleigh, Rician and exponential distributions. These scenarios form a much bigger
picture when Delay-Doppler is considered for secure communication and how correlation of
channel gains would help in achieving secure communication.
Additionally, it is planned to improve the results using other approximations of the
solution of the partial differential equations by different schemes. Also, in this work, the
explicit method was used for estimation of the solution of the partial differential equations.
As a result, stability of the method depends from steps stepi . To solve the stability problem
of the proposed approximation scheme, it would be better to apply implicit scheme1 , since
the stability of the estimation will not depend on the values of the steps stepi .
The third direction for future research work is to consider the correlation between channel
gains gM and gE and random additive terms nM and nE . In general, it is planned to consider
the following dependence

nM ∼ N (0, ΣM ), ΣM = ΣM (gM ),

nE ∼ N (0, ΣE ), ΣE = ΣE (gE )
Hence, the main task of the thesis is generalized by the assumption that magnitude of the
noises nM and nE in the channels X ⇒ Y and X ⇒ Z depend on the channel gains. The
main areas of future work will be to investigate the properties of the secrecy capacity in
more general cases and to develop algorithms for estimation of the CS for MIMO systems.

1

Also known as Backward method
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